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Companies as Religious Liberty Claimants
Rex Ahdar*
A B S T R A C T
Can a company bring a claim alleging that its religious freedom has been violated?
Some recent authority suggests ‘yes’, at least insofar as the company is a one-person
company or a closely held corporation. This article examines the subject, the goal
being the exploration of a coherent and principled basis for the granting, if at all, of the
right for an ordinary business corporation to sue to enforce the right to religious free-
dom, or to claim an exemption designed for religious persons or organizations.
The determining principle governing the legitimacy of a claim ought to be the nature
of the act and not the actor.
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Can a company claim the right of religious liberty? Initially, the idea might strike one
as absurd. How can a business like Vodafone or Marks & Spencer hold religious be-
liefs (Trinitarian or Unitarian? agnostic or theistic?) or engage in religious conduct
(how could it genuflect, be baptized or make the Hajj?). But once we proceed past
the large business behemoths to the small family businesses where the Baptist
builder, Muslim mechanic, or the Hindu hairdresser has incorporated his or her pride
and joy, then the question is not so bizarre.
Two recent cases on opposite sides of the Atlantic have addressed this topic. Each
allowed a corporate claimant to bring its religious rights claim. These provide an
interesting contrast to the recent determinations of the Victorian Court of Appeal
and the Northern Ireland County Court that each rejected this notion. In this article,
I wish to offer some exploratory thoughts on the issue. In Section 2, I briefly canvass
the notion of companies that pursue both profit and some charitable, altruistic, or re-
ligious end and whether they ought to be recognized as having religious rights. In
the next four sections, I analyze a quartet of recent cases that examined this very
thing. In Section 7, I draw some lessons from the emergent case law and, finally, in
Section 8, I offer some preliminary thoughts on the way ahead.
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2 . T H E F A I T H - B A S E D C O M P A N Y
Can a company have religious beliefs? Many regard the very suggestion as
nonsensical.
In a stimulating article, Jason Iuliano1 argues that to ascribe beliefs or intentions
to a company is not simply to speak metaphorically. Corporations have distinct ‘in-
tentionality’2 that differs from the intentional states of mind of their constituent
members:
corporations are intentional agents and, going even further, . . . they are per-
sons. They are not flesh-and-blood humans like you and me. Nonetheless,
they are persons in a very real sense. Importantly, my argument does not re-
quire that corporations be granted the same range of constitutional rights
that natural persons enjoy. Instead, its primary purpose is to illustrate that cor-
porations are not mere reflections of their shareholders or employees.
As philosophical theories show, they are persons in their own right.3
In terms of the main theories of corporate personhood, the artificial entity (or fic-
tion or concession) theory4 holds that corporations are mere creatures of the state:
‘as lifeless, artificial entities, they are incapable of exercising religion, engaging in
speech or pursuing other “liberty” interests.’5 Second, the aggregate entity (or con-
tractual) theory conceives of companies as the aggregate of the individuals (share-
holders) who comprise them. Corporations can possess rights but only to the extent
that these can be clearly attributed to the collection of individuals within them. Last,
the real entity (or natural or corporate realist) theory holds that corporations derive
their rights neither from the state nor the shareholders, but instead they are real per-
sons and intentional actors. They are ‘distinct from, but nonetheless tied, to their
shareholders’.6 The state is powerless to create corporations, and all it can do is rec-
ognize, or refuse to recognize, their existence.
Even if we grant that companies are real persons, possessing beliefs and rights, it
does not follow that companies will often be able to successfully assert their religious
rights. ‘When rules are extended to companies, they do not, and cannot, operate in
precisely the same way or with the same consequences as they do when applied to nat-
ural persons.’7 The usual sincerity requirement is a strict limitation on the availability
of any religious freedom or exemption claim. It is open for a court to reject a claim be-
cause of evidence showing that the present conduct or practice is not a sincere or
genuine manifestation of religious belief. The claimant’s conduct ought to be ‘in good
1 Jason Iuliano, ‘Do Corporations Have Religious Rights?’ (2015) 90 Indiana Law Journal 47.
2 ibid 75ff.
3 ibid 48 (emphasis in original).
4 See Frederik Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence (orig OUP 1930; repr Scientia 1978) ch
1; Fiona Macmillan Patfield, ‘Challenges for Company Law’ in Patfield (ed), Perspectives on Company Law:
1 (Kluwer Law 1995) 7, ch 1.
5 Iuliano (n 1) 56.
6 ibid.
7 Ross Grantham, ‘Commentary on Goddard’ in Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett (eds), Corporate
Personality in the 20th Century (Hart 1998) 68, ch 3.
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faith, neither fictitious nor capricious and that it is not an artifice’.8 Ironically, it might
be easier to discern the beliefs of a company compared to an individual.
[W]e can better peer into the mind of a corporation [to evaluate sincerity] than
into the mind of a natural person. After all, we can view the decision-making pro-
cedures employed by a corporation and the interactions of its managers and
board of directors. We can see the corporate intentional states emerge. The
same is impossible to do with respect natural persons. Whereas the corporate
mind is potentially observable, the human mind is sealed off from the judiciary.9
Few companies would be able to satisfy the requirement that they genuinely
seek an exemption for religious and not (say) financial or competitive advantage
reasons. In large public companies, the multiplicity of persons holding different
worldviews and religious positions would make a coherent, sincere claim formid-
ably difficult, if not impossible, to sustain. In language of the jurisprudence
of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), religious
rights claimants must possess ‘views that attain a certain level of cogency, serious-
ness, cohesion, and importance’,10 a threshold that seems manifestly beyond the
reach of public companies.
Turning from these brief philosophical ruminations, Ronald Colombo in an im-
portant recent book11 explores the expansion of a different kind of commercial com-
pany or ‘for-profit corporation’, as they are called in the United States. Alongside the
‘traditional’ profit-seeking business corporation, a plethora of companies have flour-
ished of late, whose aims include (together with the object to pursue profits) the
philanthropic, environmental, religious, artistic, and so on. Colombo dubs these
‘postmodern corporations’ in contradistinction for the conventional ‘modern’ profit-
maximizing corporation of economics textbooks.12 Colombo describes this new
breed of corporation thus:
[T]hey do not consider themselves beholden to profits alone. Their share-
holders bargain around the rules that arguably require them to strictly maxi-
mize shareholder profits. They embrace certain principles and values as ends
in themselves, willing to sacrifice potential financial gain, and to accept
decreased profitability, in pursuit of them.13
Within the increasingly capacious postmodern corporation fold is a large subset
containing what Colombo calls ‘religiously expressive corporations’.14 I will relabel
8 Syndicrat Northcrest v Amselm, 2004 SCC 47; (2004) 241 DLR (4 th) 1, [52]. See further Rex Ahdar and
Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 193–95.
9 Iuliano (n 1).
10 Eweida v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37, [81].
11 Ronald J Colombo, The First Amendment and the Business Corporation (OUP 2014) 95.
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them ‘faith-based companies’ by way of extension of the now familiar phenomenon of
faith-based organizations.15 Owners of these companies firmly eschew a rigid dualism
between the sacred and the secular spheres in favour of a holistic view of life.16 Work
and faith are not in tension, nor are they compartmentalized into two separate realms;
rather, faith and work are integrated and one’s faith is expressed through one’s work.17
Recognizing the power and ubiquity of the corporate form, certain individuals
have combined to build and sustain corporations that adhere to their most
deeply held convictions of all: their religious values. Motivating these individ-
uals has not been a desire to proselytize per se, but rather a desire to serve
their own needs—and the needs of other people of faith. This should not be
surprising, as many people of faith, from a variety of religious backgrounds,
feel alienated from if not downright excluded from a marketplace and corpor-
ate world driven primarily by the pursuit of profit. . . . . Predictably, they have
created niche enterprises where individuals of shared religious convictions can
pool resources, coming together as directors, and employees, investors and
customers. These corporations are commonly committed not simply to honor-
able business practices broadly speaking, but rather to the principles of certain,
particular religious traditions.18
While many, if not most, companies undoubtedly continue to fit the traditional
business mould, there are some companies who pursue moral and religious object-
ives in tandem with profit-making. This is hardly a novel observation. A generation
ago John Paul II made a similar point in Centesimus Annus:
In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit, but is to be
found in its very existence as a community of persons who in various ways are en-
deavouring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group at the
service of the whole of society. Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it
is not the only one; other human and moral factors must also be considered
which, in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a business.19
Interestingly, contemporary US corporations law has recently recognized the
emergence of Benefit Corporations or ‘B-Corps’.20 A Model Benefit Corporation
15 For an excellent analysis of faith-based organizations through a religious freedom lens, see Ira Lupu and
Robert Tuttle, ‘The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution’ (2005) 55 DePaul Law Review 1.
16 See eg Arthur Holmes, Contours of a World View (Eerdmans 1983) ch 14; Brian J Walsh and J Richard
Middleton, The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian World View (InterVarsity Press 1984) 67–69.
17 See eg John Stott, New Issues Facing Christians Today (3rd rev edn, Marshall Pickering 1999) ch 9.
18 Colombo (n 11) xv.
19 John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (Encyclical Letter, 1 May 1991) s 35 (emphasis in original) <http://w2.vatican.
va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html>. See also
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (US Conference of
Catholic Bishops Publishing 2004) ss 338–40
20 See Marc Greendorfer, ‘Blurring Lines Between Churches and Secular Corporations: the Compelling
Case of the Benefit Corporation’s Right to the Free Exercise of Religion (with a post-Hobby Lobby epi-
logue)’ (2014) 39 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 819.
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Code21 was adapted and passed into law by the state of Maryland in 2010. These hy-
brid entities combine social goals in conjunction with pursuit of profits for their
shareholders. Selected shareholders can take action to compel the company to ad-
vance the social goals it was founded to pursue,22 even if such activities might be at
the expense of profits. Among the non-exhaustive examples of activities that a
B-Corp must pursue to comply with the requirement that it accomplish its ‘general
public benefit’ purpose are activities that have positive effects upon the community
‘of a religious nature’.23
To summarize, believers whose desire to serve God takes them along a commer-
cial path may form companies, and these enterprises may be informed and guided by
the religious precepts of their creators. So ‘to the extent that the law impedes such
religiously guided corporate conduct, we have a potential free exercise claim.’24
3 . H O B B Y L O B B Y
But the Hobby Lobby decision, I think, has us all teetering on the brink of cor-
porate anthropomorphism . . . .25
In Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc,26 the scope of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA), better known as ‘Obamacare’, was scrutinized.
Various family-run retail chains sought an exemption from part of the compulsory
scheme. The healthcare legislation requires employers with 50 or more employees to
provide medical insurance. Failure to do so renders the firm liable to a $100 per day
fine for each affected employee. Preventive care and screening for female workers is
part of the Obamacare group-health-insurance coverage. This, in turn, includes 20
methods of FDA-approved contraception. Four of these methods were of concern to
the respondent firms. The methods may have the effect of stopping an already fertil-
ized egg from developing any further by preventing its attachment to the uterus.
They, the abortifacients, comprised two forms, commonly called the ‘morning after’
pill and two types of intrauterine device. The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) does authorize exemptions for ‘religious employers’ (defined as
‘churches, their integrated auxiliaries and conventions of associations of churches’),
as well as ‘the exclusively religious activities of any religious order’. Certain religious
non-profit organizations could also claim an exemption. But what about an everyday
business, a ‘for-profit corporation’?
David and Barbara Green and their adult children—all devout Christians—run
two family businesses. The successful arts and craft store, Hobby Lobby, numbers
some 500 outlets and employs more than 13,000 workers. David Green, a son,
21 See <http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation>.
22 Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (n 20) s 305(c).
23 Delaware Code Ann, Title 8 (Corporations), s 362(b) (2013): <http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/
c001/sc15/>.
24 Colombo (n 11) 53.
25 Suzanne McGee, ‘Corporations, “Artificial People” and the Unintended Risks of Hobby Lobby’ Guardian
(6 July 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jul/06/corporations-artificial-people-hobby-
lobby-rights-power-influence>.
26 134 S Ct 2751 (2014); 573 US (2014).
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operates 35 Christian bookstores (Mardel), and it employs nearly 400 staff. The
third firm, Conestoga Wood Specialties, is a woodworking business and has 950 em-
ployees. It is owned and run by Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons, all
of whom are devout Mennonites. All three firms are ‘closely held’27 for-profit
corporations.
The Greens and Hahns believe that their businesses should run according to
Christian teachings. The Greens, for example, close their stores on Sundays despite
this costing them a considerable amount in forgone sales. They (and the Hahns) be-
lieve that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate
access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point.
All three firms sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment seeking to enjoin the implementation of the ACA’s contracep-
tion mandate as it related to the four contraceptives. The respective district courts in
Pennsylvania (the Hahns) and Oklahoma (the Greens) denied the injunctions. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Tenth Circuit found in favour of
the Greens on the key issues and remanded the case to the District Court to recon-
sider the injunctive relief.
The issue of prime interest in this article is whether the companies could sue
under the relevant law. HHS contended that they could not sue because they were
profit-making enterprises. (The owners were precluded from suing since the regula-
tions apply only to companies and not to the owners themselves).
By a bare majority (5–4) the Supreme Court held in favour of the respondents.
Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) for the Court began:
HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give up the right
to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, avail-
able to their competitors, of operating as corporations.28
The resolution of this issue initially followed a very simple statutory interpretation
path. The RFRA applies to a ‘person’s’ exercise of religion. The Dictionary Act states
that the word ‘person’ ‘include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, part-
nerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.’ So, unless there
was something about the RFRA context that ‘indicate[d] otherwise’, the Dictionary
27 A closely held corporation is, surprisingly, not clearly defined in Hobby Lobby. The Court refers (at pages
2764, 2765, and 2774) to such companies being owned and controlled by a single family, which holds all
the voting shares and controls the board of directors. According to the IRS (Inland Revenue Service,
USA), a closely held corporation is one that ‘has more than 50% of the value of its outstanding stock
owned (directly or indirectly) by 5 or fewer individuals at any time during the last half of the tax year’.
<http://www.irs.gov/Help-&-Resources/Tools-&-FAQs/FAQs-for-Individuals/Frequently-Asked-Tax-
Questions-&-Answers/Small-Business,-Self-Employed,-Other-Business/Entities/Entities-5> 24 January
2016. See Stephanie Armour and Rachel Feintzeig, ‘Hobby Lobby Ruling Raises Question: What Does
“Closely Held” Mean?’ Wall Street Journal (30 June 2014) (around 90% of companies in the US are
closely held).
28 ibid 2767.
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Act provided ‘a quick, clear, and affirmative answer’29 to the question at hand. There
was nothing indicating otherwise.
The First Amendment and RFRA case law revealed that claims have been brought
by nonprofit corporations. HHS conceded that a nonprofit company could be a ‘per-
son’ for the purposes of the RFRA. For the Court there was ‘no known understand-
ing of the term “person” that includes some but not all corporations.’30
HHS’s next argument concentrated upon ‘exercise of religion’. How can a com-
pany have and exercise a religion? In the Court’s view, neither HHS nor the vigorous
dissent of Justice Ginsburg and her colleagues provided ‘any persuasive explanation
for this conclusion’.31
First, the corporate nature of a claimant cannot be the reason, for the HHS con-
ceded non-profit companies can avail themselves of the protection of the RFRA.
Second, is the profit-making objective a disqualifying characteristic? The answer,
again, was negative since individuals who were pursuing profits could claim the benefit
of the First Amendment’s free exercise guarantee. ‘If, as Braunfeld [a 1961 Supreme
Court decision] recognized, a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may as-
sert a free-exercise claim, why can’t Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do the
same?’32 But don’t for-profit firms exist simply to make money? Incorrect, said the
Court, for modern corporate law shows that for-profit companies may, and do, pursue
humanitarian and altruistic goals as well. That being the case, they can equally pursue
religious objectives.33 Interestingly, as the Court noted (and as I mentioned briefly ear-
lier in Section 2), half of the states recognize ‘benefit corporations’, a dual-purpose
companies that aim to achieve both a profit and a benefit to the public.34
Third, said HHS and the Minority, surely there is a clear distinction between
non-profit and for-profit companies? No: ‘the actual picture is less clear-cut.’35 Some
persons with charitable or religious aims may deliberately decline to organize as non-
profits to take advantage of the benefits that the for-profit form (political lobbying or
limited liability, for example) affords.36 In a significant passage, the Court explains:
The principal dissent . . . [Justice Ginsburg et al] stat[es] that ‘[f]or-profit cor-
porations are different from religious nonprofits in that they use labor to make
a profit, rather than to perpetuate the religious values shared by a community
of believers.’ . . . The first half of this statement is a tautology; for-profit cor-
porations do indeed differ from nonprofits insofar as they seek to make a profit
for their owners, but the second part is factually untrue. As the activities of the
for-profit corporations involved in these cases show, some for-profit
29 ibid 2768.
30 ibid 2769 (emphasis in original).
31 ibid.
32 ibid 2770. In Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599 (1961), the Supreme Court entertained an appeal from sev-
eral individual Orthodox Jewish retail merchants challenging a Sunday closing law in Philadelphia. See
also Gallagher v Crown Kosher Market of Massachusetts Inc, 366 US 617 (1961) (standing of for-profit cor-
poration to bring suit under the First Amendment left open).
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corporations do seek ‘to perpetuate the religious values shared,’ in these cases,
by their owners. Conestoga’s Vision and Values Statement declares that the
company is dedicated to operating ‘in [a] manner that reflects our Christian
heritage and the highest ethical and moral principles of
business.’ . . . Similarly, Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose proclaims that
the company ‘is committed to . . . . [h]onoring the Lord in all we do by
operating . . . in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.’37
Fourth, how could a court or tribunal ever ascertain the sincere beliefs of a cor-
poration? A large public company such as WalMart, Ford, or Verizon would com-
promise numerous shareholders with diverse religious and philosophical beliefs.
Undoubtedly so, accepted the Court, but these sorts of giant companies were un-
likely to bring a religious liberty claim and, moreover, this situation was not before
the Court: ‘The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each
owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the
sincerity of their religious beliefs.’38
The Court went on to find that the contraception mandate did ‘substantially bur-
den’ the three firms’ exercise of their religion:
If the companies continue to offer group health plans that do not cover the
contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100 per day for each affected indi-
vidual . . . . For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 million per day or
about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000
per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or
about $15 million per year. These sums are surely substantial.39
Having substantially burdened the three firms’ religious liberty, was the regulation
(i) in furtherance of a ‘compelling governmental interest’, and (ii) the ‘least restrict-
ive means’ of furthering that interest?
The Court accepted that the compelling state interest subtest was met, but not
the least-restrictive-means standard. The HHS failed to convince the Court that the
Government could not provide contraceptive care directly to female employees af-
fected by the three firms’ exemption. There was already a back-up mechanism in
place for employees of nonprofits exempted from the contraception mandate. This
could readily be extended to for-profit closely held companies too. Importantly, if
the respondent firms’ religious interest were to be accommodated, the female em-
ployees affected would continue to receive contraceptive coverage and be able to ac-
cess them ‘with minimal logistical and administrative obstacles’.40
Finally, would the proverbial floodgates now open? Would employers be able to
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and blood transfusions? There was no evidence furnished by HHS to substantiate
these fears. These must await another day:
[O]ur decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive man-
date. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-cover-
age mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious be-
liefs. Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported
by different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious
diseases) and may involve different arguments about the least restrictive means
of providing them.41
A. The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg (and joined by Justices Sotomayor,
Breyer, and Kagan), is almost as long as the Majority opinion and, with more
than a grain of hyperbole, criticizes the Court’s opinion as ‘a decision of
startling breadth’, one likely to usher in ‘havoc’, with the Majority justices hav-
ing ‘ventured into a minefield’.42
Much of the Minority opinion is, in my view, unconvincing, if not plain incor-
rect. For example, the dissent charges that the Court’s decision ‘would override sig-
nificant interests of the [exempted] corporations’ employees and covered
dependents [and] would deny legions of women who do not hold their employers’
beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure’.43
But recall that the exemption would do no such thing. Employees of Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel would still be able to access the remaining four
methods of contraceptive (remembering the other 16 were available) from the
US Government at no cost and negligible inconvenience. The Minority point out:
‘Impeding women’s receipt of benefits “by requiring them to take steps to
learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded and administered]
health benefit” was scarcely what Congress contemplated.’44 Perhaps so, but is
this really a significant burden upon employees of small religious firms? For
the sake of securing the religious freedom of their employers, is it so heinous
that the affected workers are put to form filling and some brief incursion upon their
time?
Interestingly, in Burwell v Wheaton College,45 decided just a week later, the major-
ity of Supreme Court held that filing a form might, in some contexts, be constitution-
ally objectionable. Wheaton College, a well-known Evangelical Christian liberal arts
college, asserted that the simple act of filing the self-certification form for exemption,
as a religious non-profit, from the contraception coverage of the ACA, could infringe
its religious liberty. The completion and submission of the form would, it argued,
41 ibid.
42 ibid 2787, 2805.
43 ibid 2790.
44 ibid 2802.
45 134 S Ct 2806 (2014).
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make it complicit in the provision of contraceptive coverage, in violation of its reli-
gious beliefs. It succeeded in the Supreme Court in securing an emergency injunc-
tion pending resolution of the merits of its religious freedom challenge. In her
dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) disagreed that
the high bar for the grant of an injunction had been met. On the religious freedom
infringement itself, she observed:
Let me be absolutely clear: I do not doubt that Wheaton genuinely believes
that signing the self-certification form is contrary to its religious beliefs. But
thinking one’s religious beliefs are substantially burdened—no matter how sin-
cere or genuine that belief may be—does not make it so.46
On the practicalities of the religious accommodation, the Minority stated:
Wheaton objects, however, to the minimally burdensome paperwork necessary for
the Government to administer this accommodation. If the Government cannot
require organizations to attest to their views by way of a simple self-certifica-
tion form and notify their third-party administrators of their claimed exemp-
tion, how can it ever identify the organizations eligible for the accommodation
and perform the administrative tasks necessary to make the accommodation
work? The self-certification form is the least intrusive way for the Government
to administer the accommodation.47
A week later the same Justices (Ginsburg, Sotomayer, and Kagan) who found the
‘minimally burdensome paperwork’ necessary for the accommodation of religion to
operate beyond the pale in Hobby Lobby are now opining that it is a negligible
inconvenience.
The central attack by Justice Ginsburg was upon the ability of profit-making busi-
nesses to qualify as ‘victims’ of religious discrimination:
Until this litigation, no decision of this Court recognized a for-profit corpor-
ation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law,
whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. The absence of such prece-
dent is just what one would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic
of natural persons, not artificial legal entities. As Chief Justice Marshall
observed nearly two centuries ago, a corporation is ‘an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’48
Admittedly, churches and other non-profit, religiously oriented bodies had been
long accorded standing to sue under the Constitution’s religious liberty guarantee.49
But this was an entirely different kettle of fish:
46 ibid 2812 (emphasis in original).
47 ibid 2814 (emphasis supplied).
48 ibid 2795–96.
49 See eg Kedroff v Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 334 US 94
(1952).
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No such solicitude is traditional for commercial organizations. Indeed, until
today, religious exemptions had never been extended to any entity operating
in ‘the commercial, profit-making world’. . . .
The reason why is hardly obscure. Religious organizations exist to foster the
interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit
corporations. Workers who sustain the operations of those corporations com-
monly are not drawn from one religious community. Indeed, by law, no reli-
gion-based criterion can restrict the work force of for-profit corporations . . . .
The distinction between a community made up of believers in the same reli-
gion and one embracing persons of diverse beliefs, clear as it is, constantly es-
capes the Court’s attention.50
As for the Court’s blurring of the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit
companies—based on the fact that some of the latter may pursue and advance charit-
able or religious ends—the Minority responded:
Again, the Court forgets that religious organizations exist to serve a community
of believers. For-profit corporations do not fit that bill. . . . To reiterate, ‘for-
profit corporations are different from religious non-profits in that they use
labor to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate [the] religious value[s]
[shared by a community of believers].’51
But, as the Court pointed out, factually speaking this assertion is false. It is not a
matter of ‘either/or’ but rather ‘both/and’.
To the Court’s rhetorical question, if ‘a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a
profit may assert a free-exercise claim, why can’t [Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga] . . . do the same?’ Justice Ginsburg’s reply was:
But even accepting, arguendo, the premise that unincorporated business enter-
prises may gain religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s conclusion is unsound. In a sole proprietorship, the business and its
owner are one and the same. By incorporating a business, however, an individ-
ual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for the
entity’s obligations. One might ask why the separation should hold only when
it serves the interest of those who control the corporation.52
This last sentence above implies there is some measure of hypocrisy on the part
of the owners of a corporation. The shield of corporate personality is raised for in-
solvency, taxation, regulatory, and other purposes, but is quietly removed when the
same company’s owners wish to avail themselves of human rights protection.
‘Reverse veil-lifting’ (when the owners want to be seen as separate and distinct from
50 ibid 2796.
51 ibid 2796–97 (quoting Edwards J in Gilardi v US Department of Health and Human Services, 733 F 3d
1208, 1242 (CADC 2013)).
52 Hobby Lobby (n 27) 2792.
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the company) to secure constitutional or human rights protections reeks, for some,
of having it both ways. On the other hand, there is nothing necessarily untoward in
utilizing the benefits of incorporation for some purposes and not for others. There is
no need to be locked into a rigid either/or choice: either always a separate, distinct
entity or always a mere aggregation of individual members.53
It is necessary to remind oneself that the conception of the company as a distinct
entity is a conclusion of law, not one of fact, and one relevant only in its particular
context. This means that while in some contexts the purposes for which the entity
exists demands that its separateness be stressed, in others these purposes entail
that we stress that the role of individuals joined in the common enterprise.54
The owners are being consistent in their rational pursuit of self-interest.55
Finally, and predictably, the floodgates fear was raised:
The Court’s determination that RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is
bound to have untoward effects. Although the Court attempts to cabin its lan-
guage to closely held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size,
public or private. Little doubt that [sic] RFRA claims will proliferate, for the
Court’s expansive notion of corporate personhood—combined with its other
errors in construing RFRA—invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based
exemptions from regulations they deem offensive to their faith.56
But the logic of any rule may be extended to other less desirable situations. For ex-
ample, the Common Law criminal law defence of duress or necessity of circumstances
may absolve a husband whose pregnant wife is about to give birth from driving at ex-
cessive speed to the nearest hospital.57 There is no logical reason why that same de-
fence might not be stretched to less extreme circumstances. There is no logical reason
as to why the awarding of distress damages in the law of contract cannot be extended
beyond the confines of agreements whose object is to provide enjoyment (or peace of
mind) to compensate the hurt feelings of ordinary commercial contractors.58 All rules
53 Grantham (n 7) 69. Similarly, Michael Gaertner, ‘Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should
Corporation Owners Have It Both Ways?’ (1989) 30 William & Mary Law Review 667, 677: ‘One may
properly define the corporate entity only in light of “the purpose attempted to be accomplished and the
manner of accomplishing it.” Whether a corporation is a separate legal entity or depends on the question
to be resolved. A corporation may be an entity for some purposes and not for others’ (footnote in citation
omitted).
54 Grantham (n 7) 69.
55 See Kirby J (dissenting) in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 178 ALR 253, 273
[81].
56 Hobby Lobby (n 27) 2797.
57 In New Zealand, see s 24 of the Crimes Act 1961, helpfully discussed in Police v Kawhiti [2000] 1 NZLR
117 (defence successful where an intoxicated and disqualified driver drove to Emergency Department of
the nearest hospital at 4 am after suffering a severe assault from her partner).
58 The NZ Court of Appeal in Mouat v Clark Boyce [1992] 2 NZLR 233 refused to grant distress damages
to the plaintiff in an ordinary commercial contract despite the foreseeability of hurt to feelings in this situ-
ation, a stance critiqued by Thomas J (dissenting) in Bloxham v Robinson (1996) 7 TCLR 122.
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have limits or boundaries that may be queried or ‘stretched’. But that is hardly a com-
pelling argument for not laying down the rule in the first place.
The Minority catalogue a litany of awkward possible claims in the future:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with reli-
giously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to em-
ployers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs,
including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among
others)? According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, ‘each one of these
cases . . . would have to be evaluated on its own . . . apply[ing] the compelling
interest-least restrictive alternative test.’ . . . Not much help there for the lower
courts bound by today’s decision.59
Justice Ginsburg saw ‘an overriding interest in keeping the courts “out of the busi-
ness of evaluating the relative merits of religious claims”’.60 This is a specious argu-
ment, for the courts must evaluate claims from a vast variety of religious individuals
and communities. If courts would prefer not to do so then America could abolish the
religion clauses of the First Amendment (inconceivable) and related religious free-
dom legislation such as the RFRA (barely less so). Until it does so, the courts must
lie in the litigious bed the Framers of the Constitution and Congress, indeed, the
Supreme Court itself has made for them.
Finally, there is a revealing insight from Justice Ginsburg in one brief passage. She
refers to
‘the “special solicitude” generally accorded nonprofit religion-based organizations
that exist to serve a community of believers, solicitude never before accorded to com-
mercial enterprises comprising employees of diverse faiths’.61
Here, I suggest, is the core of the dissenting justices’ objection. Religion is not
something special and not really worthy, in a modern, pluralist, and (even in the
United States) increasingly secular society, of special treatment.62 Some American
scholars have discerned the rise of a legal or secular egalitarianism.63 For those hold-
ing this mindset, claims for accommodation or exemption look like special pleading
or bare special interest demands. Indeed, for some, the claim for religious accommo-
dation has ‘become virtually synonymous with or code for discrimination’.64
59 Hobby Lobby (n 27) 2805.
60 ibid (quoting Stevens J in United States v Lee (1982) 455 US 252, 263, fn 2).
61 ibid 2802–03.
62 A recent articulation of this stance is that by Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton University
Press 2013). For a contrary view, see eg Ahdar and Leigh (n 8) 82–83, 113–15.
63 On ‘strong legal egalitarianism’, see Paul Horvitz, ‘The Hobby Lobby Moment’ (2014) 128 Harvard Law
Review 154, 170. On ‘secular egalitarianism’, see Steven D Smith, ‘Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or
Why the Smith Decision May be a Greater Loss Now Than it Was Then’ (2011) 32 Cardozo Law
Review 2033, 2046.
64 Horvitz (n 63) 172.
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4 . E X M O O R C O A S T B O A T C R U I S E S
Exmoor Coast Boat Cruises Ltd v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue &
Customs65 is a much more obscure case.66 Mr Matthew Oxenham is the sole director
and shareholder of Exmoor Coast Boat Cruises Ltd. He operates cruises out of
Lynmouth, a pretty little coastal town in Exmoor National Park in northern Devon.
The case arose from Oxenham’s determination not to send his VAT returns elec-
tronically, but by paper instead. As the Tribunal saw it, ‘Mr Oxenham clearly saw
himself on something of a crusade against the requirement to file online.’67
The Finance Act 2002 requires that all VAT returns must be filed electronically.
There is, however, an exemption in the regulations that provides
However a person—(a) who the Commissioners are satisfied is a practising
member of a religious society or order whose beliefs are incompatible with the
use of electronic communications . . . is not required to make a return
required by regulation 25 using an electronic return system.
Mr Oxenham claimed to come under this exemption.68
Judge Barbara Mosedale, sitting as the Tax Chamber Tribunal, first considered
whether Oxenham was a ‘practising member of a religious society’. The evidence was
clear that he was not. As a child he had attended Sunday School at a local Plymouth
Brethren Chapel and as an adult he stated he sympathized with the views of the
Jimites, a sect of the Plymouth Brethren. Yet, he did not attend any Brethren or
Jimite meetings, nor could he explain to the judge the reason why the Jimites re-
jected the use of the Internet. The Tribunal accordingly held he was not a practising
member of this religion, or any other.69
Second, Oxenham’s beliefs were held not be ‘incompatible’ with the use of a com-
puter or the Internet. The evidence revealed that he paid someone to create a non-
interactive webpage for his company.70 (He explained that a website was a matter of
economic necessity, since, without it, his already declining numbers of customers
would fall even further precipitating closure.71) Oxenham also consented to an ac-
countant filing returns online for another company he jointly owned with his parents
(although he had, unsuccessfully, requested a similar religious-based exemption for
65 [2014] UKFTT 1103 (TC).
66 I am grateful to the excellent Frank Cranmer, Law and Religion UK blog for publizising this case:
Cranmer, ‘Can a commercial company have ‘beliefs’? Exmoor Coast Boat Cruises Ltd v Revenue & Customs’
in Law & Religion UK (22 December 2014) <http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2014/12/22/can-a-
commercial-company-have-beliefs-exmoor-coast-boat-cruises-ltd-v-revenue-customs/> 24 January 2016.
67 Exmoor [20]. ‘He considered the law unfair; he did not see why exemption had to be restricted to mem-
bers of a religious group; he did not see why exemption had to be restricted to religious beliefs; he con-
sidered online filing was made compulsory merely to justify the cost of the online filing system; if he won
his case he . . . clearly hoped to persuade other persons to pursue exemption. He believed that refusing to
file online was taking a stand against human behaviour inducing climate change’ (ibid).
68 For an earlier case where this same religious-based exemption from the VAT law was successfully claimed
by a Seventh-day Adventists couple (who ran a honey making and beekeeping partnership), see
Blackburn v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 525 (TC). Again, Judge Barbara Mosedale presided.
69 The Tribunal heard some contested evidence that his main religion was paganism: Exmoor [17]–[18].
70 See <http://www.theglenlyngorge.co.uk/boat_trips.htm> 24 January 2016.
71 Exmoor [29].
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those returns too).72 The Tribunal took an unsympathetic view of this, commenting,
first, that a belief was not ‘cogent, serious, cohesive and important’ (the standard set
by European Convention case law73) if the holder was unwilling to ‘make economic
sacrifices for it’ and, second, that Oxenham ought not to be allowed to ‘pick and
choose’ when it suited him to adhere to his religious principles.74
Under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, all legislation, including subor-
dinate legislation, must be read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with
the ECHR. Was the regulation mandating compulsory, electronic filing of returns
compatible with Article 9 of the Convention, which provides that ‘everyone’ has the
right to religious freedom?
Logically, noted Judge Mosedale, the first question was whether the appellant, the
Exmoor Cruise company, had any human rights. In an earlier case, her Honour had
ruled that: ‘the Convention properly interpreted applies to give human rights to
companies where those companies are the alter egos of their owners. Companies
have a right to a private life where that private life is the private life of the alter ego
of the company.’75
The Revenue argued that to hold that the appellant company had human rights
because it was the alter ego of its director/shareholder was to lift impermissibly the
corporate veil. A recent UK Supreme Court case, Prest v Petrodel, affirmed that:
Subject to very limited exceptions, most of which are statutory, a company is a
legal entity distinct from its shareholders. It has rights and liabilities of its own
which are distinct from those of its shareholders. Its property is its own, and
not that of its shareholders. In Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC
22, the House of Lords held that these principles applied as much to a com-
pany that was wholly owned and controlled by one man as to any other
company. . . . The separate personality and property of a company is some-
times described as a fiction, and in a sense it is. But the fiction is the whole
foundation of English company and insolvency law.76
But, explained the Tribunal, Prest was not a case about whether companies have
human rights. Prest restated the long-standing position at English Common Law, but
the Human Rights Act was a statute and supreme over the Common Law. The rele-
vant question then was what the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had
ruled on the issue.
In Pine Valley Developments Ltd,77 two companies and the owner/director of those
companies, claimed a breach of the Convention. The ECtHR found that there was a
breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right to property and possessions)
72 ibid [12]–[13], [31], [81].
73 See Campbell and Cosans v UK [1982) 4 EHRR 293, 304 ([36]) (a ‘conviction’, noted the
ECtHR, ‘denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’).
74 Exmoor [76], [82]–[83].
75 LH Bishop [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC) [562].
76 [2013] UKSC 34, [8] (Lord Sumption).
77 [1991] ECHR 12742/87.
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combined with Article 14 (the right to be free from discrimination) against one of
the companies and the owner of the companies. On the corporate veil, it
commented:
Pine Valley and Healy Holdings were no more than vehicles through which
Mr Healy proposed to implement the development for which outline planning
permission had been granted. On this ground alone it would be artificial to
draw distinctions between the three appellants as regards their entitlement to
claim to be ‘victims’ of a violation.78
For Judge Mosedale, this was ‘a clear statement by the Court that a company
could be a victim of a breach of human rights. This means that the Court ruled
(albeit without hearing argument) that a company can have human rights.’79
So, to return to the issue at hand, ‘can a company have a right to manifest religion
when a company itself is inchoate and unable to have any beliefs at all?’80 Judge
Mosedale held:
My conclusion from Pine Valley is that a company has human rights if and to
the extent it is the alter ego of a person (or, potentially, a group of people).
Therefore, it must be seen as being in the shoes of that person and must pos-
sess the same human rights because any other decision would deny that person
his human rights.81
Therefore, while it is ludicrous to suggest a company has a religion, or private
life or family, nevertheless a company which is the alter ego of a person can be
a victim of a breach of [Article 9] (the right to manifest its religion) if, were it
not so protected, that person’s human rights would be breached.82
The respondent Revenue disagreed. The taxpayer himself ought to sue in his own
name to remedy his breach of human rights. But here (as in Hobby Lobby), the
owner of the company did not have the right to bring an action against the manda-
tory e-filing obligation. Nonetheless, Oxenham could, rejoined the Revenue, still
make a complaint to the ECtHR. But, noted Judge Mosedale, he would have no do-
mestic recourse for his alleged breach of his human rights, a distinctly ‘unappealing’83
position. Furthermore, the Revenue’s argument, if accepted, would mean the
Convention discriminated between a person who traded in their own name and a
person who incorporated and traded via a company.
Yet, it is clear from Pine Valley that the Court cannot see a good reason to




81 ibid [71] (emphasis added).
82 ibid [72] (emphasis added).
83 ibid [74].
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distinction. Mr Oxenham’s rights are the appellant company’s rights and can
be relied on by the appellant in this Tribunal.84
5 . C H R I S T I A N Y O U T H C A M P S
In Christian Youth Camps Ltd v Cobaw Community Health Service Ltd,85 the Victorian
Court of Appeal held by a majority (2 votes to 1) that Christian Youth Camps Ltd
(CYC) did not qualify for the religious exemption provided for a ‘person’ in the
Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic). Cobaw runs the WayOut Project, a ‘youth and
sexual diversity’ venture designed to furnish support and suicide prevention services
to gay young people. It sought to hire CYC’s Phillip Island Adventure Resort for the
weekend. The homosexual lifestyle would be portrayed during the camp workshops
as normal (‘a natural part of the range of human sexualities’86). CYC baulked at this
and refused to accept the booking. There is a great deal to digest from this important
case,87 but my present focus is simply upon the issue whether CYC as an ordinary
nonreligious company could claim the benefit of this religious freedom exemption.
Section 77 provides that: ‘Nothing in Part 3 applies to discrimination by a person
against another person if the discrimination is necessary for the first person to com-
ply with the person’s genuine religious beliefs or principles.’
I referred to CYS’s right to claim as a non-religious company. The Court (unani-
mously) held that, despite its ownership by the Brethren Church and many (but not
all) of its objects being Christian, it functioned as a commercial enterprise and not ‘a
body established for religious purposes’ for the purpose of the exemption in s 75(2)
of the Equal Opportunity Act.
75 Religious bodies
(2) Nothing in Part 3 applies to anything done by a body established for reli-
gious purposes that—
a. conforms with the doctrines of the religion; or
b. is necessary to avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of people of the
religion.
The CYC rented the Phillip Island camp to Christian and secular groups (even
Collingwood Football Club88), the secular organizations comprising around 80 per
cent of its hires. Its advertising, webpage, and other promotional literature made no
reference to its Christian ownership or aims. ‘CYC’s conduct of its camp’s business
was not, in any relevant sense, a “religious” activity. At best, on the argument of the
applicants, it was a commercial activity intended to raise money to enable the
84 ibid.
85 [2014] VSCA 75 (16 April 2014).
86 ibid [28]
87 See the detailed analysis of Neil Foster, ‘Discrimination, Language and Freedom of Religion: Two
Important Law and Religion Decisions in Australia’ Paper presented at Varieties of Secularism, Religion and
Law, International Law and Religion Studies, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 5–7 October 2014
<http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/85/> accessed 24 January 2016.
88 [2014] VSCA 75 [217]. British readers could substitute Millwall FC here.
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trustees of the [Christian Brethren] Trust to advance charitable purposes consistent
with the doctrines of the religion.’89
The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal held90 that CYC could be a person
for the purposes of section 77.91 The majority of the Court disagreed with the Tribunal.
In Maxwell P’s view, ‘it [was] clear from the language of s 77, and from the rela-
tionship between the exemption provisions in ss 75-77, that Parliament did not in-
tend a corporation to be able to invoke the exemption under s 77.’92 I will bypass
the detailed points of statutory construction based on the scheme of the Act (import-
ant as they are) and concentrate upon the larger points of policy and principle:
[F]or a body corporate to avail itself of the protection under s 77, it would
have to demonstrate that it had ‘genuine religious beliefs or principles’ and
that the relevant conduct was ‘necessary . . . to comply with’ those beliefs or
principles. A corporation, of course, has ‘neither soul nor body’ [Motel Marine
Pty Ltd v IAC (Finance) Pty Ltd (1963) 110 CLR 9 at 14].93
It has never been suggested that corporations can meaningfully be said to have
religious beliefs, let alone that they should be entitled to enjoy a freedom of reli-
gious belief. The Attorney-General drew attention to the statement of Latham
CJ, that it was ‘obvious that a company cannot exercise a religion’ [Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 at 147],
but submitted that the ‘generality’ of this statement could no longer be regarded
as correct in the light of a series of decisions of the European Commission of
Human Rights concerning art 9 of the European Convention.94
But, for the President, these decisions from Strasbourg were not relevant here,
since they concerned church bodies which had decided to incorporate—not ordinary
commercial companies.95 This ignores the cases under the ECHR where the ECtHR
has held that companies may claim for alleged breaches of their human rights, albeit
not religious rights. Interestingly, Maxwell P went out of his way to decide this point
despite the respondents, Cobaw, not raising it on appeal. ‘It is not an academic or
hypothetical question. On the contrary, it was the subject of a ruling by the Tribunal.
It is, moreover, fundamental to the operation of the religious freedom exemptions.’96
Next, Neave JA concurred with the President on the corporation’s inability to
claim the shelter of section 77:
In my view, s 77 does not apply to corporations. Like other human rights, the
right to freedom of religious belief can only be enjoyed by natural persons.
89 ibid [266].
90 Cobaw Community Health Services v Christian Youth Camps Ltd (Anti-Discrimination) [2010] VCAT 1613
(Judge Hampel).
91 This did not ultimately avail the appellant as it failed to meet other criteria necessary to make out the
defence.
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Because a corporation is not a natural person and has ‘neither soul nor body’,
it cannot have a conscious state of mind amounting to a religious belief or
principle. It follows that applying the s 77 exception to a corporation would re-
quire the adoption of a legal fiction which attributes the beliefs of a person or
persons to the corporation.97
The assertion that the right of religious liberty can only be enjoyed by natural per-
sons is plainly wrong. It is trite law that the right extends to collectives and associ-
ations in their own right.98 For example, a church qua church can claim the right of
religious freedom and sue (and be sued) under bills of rights and religious discrimin-
ation legislation.99
Although, continued Neave JA, legislation commonly imposed liability upon com-
panies by virtue of provisions attributing the intention or state of mind of an officer
to that of the company, these did not determine this particular matter:
The existence of these provisions does not require the conclusion that a cor-
poration is to be deemed to hold beliefs on matters such as the existence of a
deity or deities, the presence of an afterlife, or in the case of Christianity, the
centrality of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, in the absence of a spe-
cific legislative provision which requires such ‘deeming’ to occur.100
The practicalities of ascertaining the company’s religious beliefs were an obstacle:
An individual can give evidence on their religious beliefs and a court can
make a factual decision as to whether those beliefs are genuinely held. But
there would be practical difficulties in attributing a particular religious belief
or principle to a corporation. The memorandum and articles of a company
may show that it was established for religious purposes, but even if such
documents contain statements of purposes or ‘principles’ they are unlikely to
set out the ‘beliefs’ of the corporation. There are difficulties in attributing the
religious beliefs of members of the board to a corporation, because board
members may not have the same beliefs, or their beliefs may change over
time.101
While undoubtedly there are, in general, formidable, if not insuperable, prac-
tical difficulties in discovering the religious (or any other beliefs) of a large public
company such as Heineken or Philips, this was not relevant to this particular
case.
97 ibid [413].
98 See Ahdar and Leigh (n 8) ch 11.
99 See eg Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Amos (1987)
483 US 727.
100 [2014] VSCA 75, [416].
101 ibid [417] (emphasis added).
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Dissenting, Redlich JA held that section 77 could apply to CYC Ltd as a commer-
cial corporation:
Although a corporation is a distinct legal entity with legal rights, obligations,
powers and privileges different from those of the natural persons who created
it, own it, or whom it employs, there is ample legal basis to impute to it the re-
ligious beliefs of its directors and others who the law may regard as its mind or
will. The Tribunal observed that subjective intentions may be attributed to cor-
porations, including the necessary mental element for a crime. The corporation
may make and express moral, ethical, environmental or other judgments in the
discourse of the public square and participate in the defining of social norms.
As this case shows, it will not necessarily be difficult to identify the corporation’s
state of mind. There is no principled reason for treating a corporation as capable
of forming and acting upon its views in any of these areas but incapable of
forming and acting upon religious ones.102
The particular legal form of the claimant, flowing from its decision whether to in-
corporate or not, ought not to determine its right to religious freedom:
It would be anomalous were s 75(2) alone to apply to corporate bodies. It
would follow that wherever a corporation engages in commercial activity but
the corporation was not established for religious purposes, s 77 would not en-
able the exemption to apply to both the corporation and those particular indi-
viduals whose acts are to be treated as those of a corporation. That interpret-
ation would produce the unintended result that individuals who operate a
business would have different levels of religious freedom, depending upon whether
the business was incorporated or not. It would force individuals of faith to choose
between forfeiting the benefits of incorporation or abandoning the precepts of
their religion.103
6 . A S H E R S B A K I N G
In the controversial and much-publicized case, Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd,104 the
plaintiff, Gareth Lee, a homosexual activist, ordered a cake from the defendant bak-
ery, a company having six branches, a staff of around 65 and net assets of over
£1 m.105 The icing on Lee’s cake would have the words ‘Support Gay Marriage’, the
102 ibid [476] (emphasis added).
103 ibid [490] (emphasis added).
104 [2015] NICty 2.
105 A sampling of the voluminous commentary includes those that condemned the case, eg ‘Icing on the
cake’ (Editorial), Daily Telegraph (20 May 2015); Melanie McDonagh, ‘The “Gay Cake” Case
Highlights New Intolerance Developing in Ireland’ Spectator (20 May 2014); and those who supported
the decision, eg Joshua Rozenberg, ‘The “Gay Cake” Ruling is a Victory for Equality in Northern
Ireland’ Guardian (20 May 2015); Mary Hassan, ‘Finally: A Victory for the LGBT Community in
Northern Ireland’ Huffington Post (19 May 2015) <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mary-hassan/gay-
rights-northern-ireland_b_7313366.html>.
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logo of QueerSpace (a LGBT lobby organization) and a colour picture of the Sesame
Street TV show characters, Ernie and Bert. After initially (and reluctantly) accepting
the order on the day, the third defendant, Karen McArthur, a director of the family
firm, phoned back Lee telling him the bakery could no longer fulfill his order. To do
so would violate the owner’s, the McArthur family’s, religious beliefs. McArthur apol-
ogized and arranged for a refund. Lee was upset and the culmination of his grievance
was a successful complaint to the Equality Commission. The County Court held that
the defendant bakery had contravened the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation)
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 and the Fair Employment and Treatment
Order 1998. Ashers Baking’s conduct in refusing the cake order constituted unlawful
direct discrimination on the basis of the customer’s sexual orientation. The defend-
ants’ pleas that their religious beliefs provided them with a defence were rejected.
They contended that to accept the order would have forced them to violate their
conscience by endorsing a cultural phenomenon (same-sex marriage) that they did
not, based on their sincere religious convictions, agree with. In Karen McArthur’s
words:
I knew that using our skills and creativity to produce a cake supporting gay
marriage—which we consider to be contrary to God’s word—was something
which would be on my conscience. If we provided that cake in these terms, I
would feel that I was betraying my faith and failing to live in accordance with what
God expects of me . . . . I wish to emphasize that this is in no way related to Mr
Lee’s sexual orientation. We have many gay customers whom we serve regularly
without any difficulty. We also have at least one gay member of staff . . . .106
For the Court, the answer was straightforward. The Regulations provided for ex-
emptions for ‘an organization the purpose of which is to practice [or advance or
teach] a religion or belief’, but denied such accommodation for ‘an organization
whose sole or main purpose is commercial’.107 Parliament had carefully considered
accommodation for religious-orientated businesses but decided not to write such an
exemption into the subordinate legislation.108
Furthermore, Article 9 of the European Convention did not provide protection ei-
ther. Article 9(2) permits restrictions upon religious liberty to, inter alia, protect the
rights and freedoms of others. Here, the protection of Lee from sexual orientation
discrimination was just such a justified and proportionate limitation.
Of most interest to this article is the question whether Ashers Baking Co Ltd
could avail itself of Article 9. The County Court held it could not. District Judge
106 [2015] NICty [17].
107 Reg 16: quoted ibid [28].
108 ibid [32]: ‘In respect of ‘Christian businesses’ again the Government accepts that some people hold very
forthright views and do not want to provide a service to some people because of their sexual orientation.
Having considered this issue the Government is firmly of the view that any person or organization that
opens a business to the public for the purpose of providing goods, facilities or services has to be pre-
pared to accept the public as a whole no matter how that public is constituted.’
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Isobel Brownlie noted that ‘it has long been recognized in Convention jurisprudence
that a limited liability company cannot invoke Article 9 rights’109 and quoted from
Kustannnus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB v Finland:
The Commission has repeatedly held that a church body or an association
with religious and philosophical objects is capable of possessing and exercising
the right to freedom of religion, since an application by such a body is in reality
lodged on behalf of its members . . .
By contrast, the Commission has held that a limited liability company, given
the fact that it concerns a profit-making corporate body, can neither enjoy nor
rely on the rights referred to in Article 9 para.1 (Art. 9-1).110
Kustannus involved a claim that the church tax violated the applicant company’s
freedom of religion. The Freethinkers’ Association in Finland had formed a company
to publish books to advance its cause. The Commission noted that the corporate
form chosen by the freethinkers was deliberate. As a limited liability company it was
‘in principle required by domestic law to pay tax as any other corporate body, regard-
less of the underlying purpose of its activities on account of its links with the appli-
cant association’.111
Earlier, in the judgment, her Honour had noted that Ashers Bakery
derived its named from a verse in Genesis which read: ‘Bread from Asher shall
be rich.’112 But she also observed that no religious objectives featured
in its Memorandum and Articles of Association, nor in its advertising or the
terms and conditions provided to customers (both conventional in-store and
online).
7 . S O M E L E S S O N S
I have canvassed a collection of cases involving crafts, cruises, camps, and cakes.
What can we take from these rather disparate cases?
First, we have some authority now that a one-person company and a
closely held company can both exercise the right of religious freedom. In the
former, the decision is of a first instance tax tribunal and the finding on standing
is arguably obiter (the claimant already being disqualified on other grounds).
In the second instance, the decision represents a bare majority of the Supreme
Court.
Second, by contrast, there is not the slightest suggestion that a large public com-
pany would have standing to sue, a notion that the UK judge in Exmoor rightly
described as ‘ludicrous’. In Hobby Lobby, the Court observed that publicly traded cor-
porations (the Minority mentioned IBM and General Electric as examples) would be
109 ibid [98].
110 App no 20471/ 92; (1996) 22 EHRR CD 69. Quoted ibid [98].
111 ibid.
112 ibid [12](Genesis 49:20)(NKJV). The New King James Version is no doubt preferable, in this health con-
scious age, to the original KJV rendering: ‘Out of Asher his bread shall be fat.’
22  Oxford Journal of Law and Religion
‘unlikely [to be] the sort of corporate giants’113 bringing religious liberty claims.
That seems indubitably correct. As the Court put it:
HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting
RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from
occurring. For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders—including insti-
tutional investors with their own set of stakeholders—would agree to run a
corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable.114
Third, objections that the corporate veil is being opportunistically pierced to find
individual rights-bearing citizens underneath have not found favour. In Hobby Lobby,
the Minority criticized the very notion a corporation might have or exercise a
religion:
[T]he exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal
entities. As Chief Justice Marshall observed nearly two centuries ago, a corpor-
ation is ‘an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contempla-
tion of law.’ Corporations, Justice Stevens more recently reminded, ‘have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires’.115
Quite so, but the Court was unmoved:
[I]t is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide
protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization
used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, offi-
cers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or an-
other. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to cor-
porations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. . . . And
protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own
and control those companies.116
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Hobby Lobby, in dismissing the Hahns’ ap-
peal, had reasoned: ‘General business corporations do not, separate and apart from
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise reli-
gion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments, or take other religiously moti-
vated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual
actors.’117 The Court’s riposte was terse: ‘All of this is true—but quite beside the
113 Hobby Lobby (n 27) 2774.
114 ibid.
115 ibid 2794, quoting from Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat 518, 636. (1819)(Marshall
CJ) and Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens J). The same
point was made by Maxwell P in CYC [321].
116 ibid 2768 (emphasis in original).
117 724 F 3d 377, 385 (3rd Cir 2013)(emphasis added).
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point. Corporations, “separate and apart from” the human beings who own, run, and
are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.’118
Fourth, the conclusion that small companies may claim standing to sue as ‘vic-
tims’ of religious freedom violations has arisen in situations where the individual
owners of the companies have been precluded from pursuing a religious liberty claim
themselves. Faced with no recourse at all, the understandable desire is to permit the
action to proceed and at least be evaluated on its merits.
8 . T H E W A Y A H E A D
The criteria for the recognition of a right of religious freedom exercisable by compa-
nies (if this is seen to be a worthwhile thing) would seem to include the following
considerations:
A. Size of the Enterprise
Is there a ceiling in terms of the numbers of persons who are shareholders
(or owners or directors) beyond which a claim will not be allowed?
It would be arbitrary to see any ceiling based on the size of the company.
Undoubtedly there are, for example, some closely held companies that are huge.
Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby noted the Mars company earned some US$33 bil-
lion in revenue and employed around 72,000 workers.119 The vast majority of fam-
ily-owned and run companies do not file this gargantuan profile, nor even Hobby
Lobby’s scale of operation.
B. Composition of the Enterprise
Must the claimants be related (members of the same family or kinship group)?
Must they all be of the same religion?
The answer to the first sub-question would seem to be negative. By contrast, the
second issue would seem to require unanimity of religious beliefs and convictions, al-
though satisfying that would seldom be a problem. The faith-based company is a
true ‘community’ of persons, drawn together by a shared religious vision.
C. The Relevant Constituency for Assessing Religious Identity
Must the owners be religiously devout and, if not, is it sufficient that the man-
agers, directors, employees (or even customers) are?
Statements in Hobby Lobby refer in passing to those who ‘own, run and are em-
ployed’120 by the company in question. Hobby Lobby focused upon the owners and
118 Hobby Lobby (n 27) 2768.
119 Hobby Lobby (n 27), Minority Opinion (n 19).
120 Hobby Lobby (n 27), 134 S Ct 2768. See similarly ibid, where Justice Alito observes: ‘An established
body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and em-
ployees) who are associated with a corporation one way or another. When rights . . . are extended to cor-
porations, whether constitutional or statutory, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people’
(italics added; underlining in original).
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thus the wider constituency within the company did not call for examination. But it
might be that the managers, directors, or employees are all religious devout, while
the owners are not (or at least the latters’ religious beliefs are unknown).121 So the
relevant persons for assessing the religious liberty claim might extend beyond the
owners. This, admittedly, will make the inquiry more complex and will, if the exten-
sion beyond owners is permissible, extend the inquiry into some decidedly murky
waters. Owners may well have different religious convictions to their employees in
the larger private or closely held companies such as Hobby Lobby.122 How potential
intra-company clashes ought to be resolved will be challenging to say the least.
D. Objective of the Company
Must the company be a nonprofit one or can it pursue profit-making and char-
itable or religious goals?
The binary either/or approach is unnecessary and unhelpful. As noted earlier, le-
gislation in many states of the United States recognizes benefit corporations, entities
with both profit-earning and non-economic public benefit objectives.
E. Motive for the Claim; Sincerity of the Claimant
Must the company’s reason for claiming the right or exemption be ‘religious’,
that is, to further or safeguard ‘religious’ beliefs or practices? Must the religious
reason be sincere?
There is nothing new here for the same inquiry is made of flesh-and-blood indi-
vidual claimants: there must be a sincere religious motivation on the part of the
company.123
Whichever factors one chooses as relevant, some quite fundamental (and difficult)
questions cannot be avoided,124 questions such as: What are we trying to achieve?
Why is it important to limit standing to sue? And who ‘deserves’ to be able to bring
a religious freedom suit? Given the fact of a serious violation of a person, or group of
persons’, religious freedom, does it matter the legal form in which they present them-
selves to court?
121 Spencer Churchill, ‘Whose religion matters in corporate RFRA claims after Burwell v Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc, 134 S Ct 2751 (2014)?’ (2015) 38 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 437, 443–44.
122 See Henry Chambers Jr, ‘The Problems Inherent in Litigating Employer Free Exercise Rights’ (2015)
86 University of Colorado Law Review 1141. He comments: ‘The expansion of an employer’s free exer-
cise rights may eventually leave the employee with the potentially unpalatable option of working at a
workplace governed by potentially limiting work rules allowed under the employer’s newly recognized
free exercise rights, or quitting’ (1166–67).
123 See Ahdar and Leigh (n 8) 193–97 (three-stage approach to stating a religious liberty claim).
124 ‘[There] is a general point about conceptual analysis. The study of concepts like law, and freedom, and
power, and democracy cannot be undertaken in a normative vacuum. Unless, for example, we have some
idea of why it might matter, why it might be thought a matter of concern whether something is a law or
not, we cannot sensibly choose among rival conceptions of this concept. . . . Justificatory argument in
political theory and jurisprudence must precede conceptual analysis, not the other way round.’ Jeremy
Waldron, ‘Legislation and Moral Neutrality’ in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (CUP 1993)
ch 7, 153 (emphasis in original): ibid 23, ch 2.
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It is my contention that the status of the claimant is generally not relevant to the
claim.125 It ought to be, generally speaking, a matter of the act and not the actor.126
The dissenting Third Circuit Court of Appeal opinion of Judge Jordan in the
Conestoga Wood Specialties (the co-appellant in the Hobby Lobby Supreme Court ap-
peal) merits quotation:
Given the special place the First Amendment plays in our free society, the
Supreme Court in Bellotti instructed that, instead of focusing on ‘whether cor-
porations “have” First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coexten-
sive with those of natural persons,’ ‘the question must be whether’ the activity
at issue falls within an area ‘the First Amendment was meant to
protect.’ . . . In other words, the operative question under the First
Amendment is what is being done—whether there is an infringement on
speech or the exercise of religion—not on who is speaking or exercising reli-
gion. Hence, in the political speech context that it then faced, the Bellotti
Court emphasized that, ‘[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one
would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type
of speech indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.’
Likewise here, the right to object on religious grounds to funding someone
else’s reproductive choices is no less legitimate because the objector is a cor-
poration rather than an individual.127
The relevant and key questions ought to be the usual ones: Is there a significant
infringement upon the claimant’s religious freedom? Does the claimant have a sin-
cere religious conviction regarding the conduct at issue? Is there a persuasive and
weighty offsetting interest to justify the limit upon the claimant’s incursion upon its
religious freedom? And so on. I have added the qualifier ‘generally’ for it is possible
to think of classes of claimant who ipso facto one would exclude on the basis of their
status alone. To take extreme examples (or perhaps not so extreme these days?), a
sacred animal or a revered mountain could not assert breach of its religious freedom.
Next, do we proceed from ‘the ground up’, that is, from ‘first principles’? Do we
proceed by way of analogy to those who are unquestionably valid claimants? If exten-
sion by analogy is the route, then the benchmarks are sizeable ones, entities with po-
tentially large numbers of individuals: not just individuals, but churches,
denominations, sects, and entire religious communities have been held to have the
right of religious freedom.
The potential company claimants to religious freedom would seem to lie along a
continuum beginning, at one end, with one-person companies and ranging to large
public companies, at the other end.
125 See also Redlich JA in CYC at [490] (quoted at fn 99 above); Colombo (n 11) 140.
126 Greendorfer (n 20) 851.
127 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp v Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services, 724 F 3d
377, 402–03 (3d Cir 2013) (The Supreme Court case quoted is First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti,
3435 US 765, 776–77 (1978)).
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No one could seriously suggest that a publicly traded company such as CocaCola,
BSkyB, or Royal Dutch Shell should be able to bring proceedings for violation of its
religious liberty. At the other end of the spectrum, the small family-owned, single-
shareholder, and sole-director company is surely a plausible candidate for the recog-
nition of the right of religious freedom. Perhaps the incorporated partnership merits
the right to sue too?
So, for now, perhaps we ought to commence modestly by recognizing one-person
companies as being able to bring a religious liberty claim. There would need to be
the obvious riders that an individual natural person would also need to satisfy: there
must be a sincere religious belief or practice of the religiously structured company
that is being infringed (in more than a trivial or de minimis fashion) by the law in
question.128 It would make sense too for there to be no allowable claim where the in-
dividual could bring a claim in his or her own name. No doubt the harsh anvil of
practical experience will yield more safeguards to ensure this extension of the right of
religious freedom is not abused.
In the Common Law tradition (and in the absence of legislation), we might just
dare to hope that cautious and incremental judicial reasoning will lead to a just and
sensible solution.
128 On the need for a more than de minimis restriction upon religious freedom, see Ahdar and Leigh (n 8)
193–94.
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